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Wilson: Juvenile Offenders and the Electric Chair: Curel and Unusual Puni

JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND THE ELECTRIC CHAIR:
CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT OR FIRM DISCIPLINE
FOR THE HOPELESSLY DELINQUENT?
INTRODUCTION

In 1833 Nicholas White, a nine-year-old boy, removed a few pieces of
crayon, valued at twopence, from the broken window of a London shop.' For
this offense Nicholas was sentenced to hang by the neck until dead.2 Juvenile
executions are not exclusively an eighteenth century English phenomenon.3
4
Modern United States courts have also sentenced youthful offenders to death.
In 1976, for example, sixteen-year-old Frank James Valencia received the
death penalty for shooting a store clerk.5 Since 1900 approximately 126
juveniles have been executed in the United States.6
No state presently authorizes juvenile courts to impose capital punishment.7

Waiver mechanisms,

however, provide

a means for transferring

juveniles into the adult criminal system where they lose the protective and rehabilitative philosophy of the juvenile justice system.8 In the adult system,
minors risk maximum adult punishments, lose the right to confidential proceedings, and are subjected to the stigma of criminal conviction. 9 If convicted
in the adult system, youths may be sentenced to death. Most states employing
E. CALVERT, CAPITAL PUNISHMLNT IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 5 (2d ed. 1971).
2. Id. at 5-6. The common law recognized no legal distinction between minors and adults.
Id. at 6.
3. See H. BEDAU, Juveniles and Capital Punishment, in THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA
54 (1964). The author notes that at least 70 teenagers were executed in the last half-century;
the youngest was a 14-year-old Negro electrocuted in 1944. Id. at 52.

1.

4. Id. at 52-56.
5. State v. Valencia, 121 Ariz. 191, 589 P.2d 434, afJ'd, 124 Ariz. 139, 602 P.2d 807 (1979),
death sentence vacated, 132 Ariz. 248, 645 P.2d 239 (1982) (en banc). For a discussion of other
recent cases imposing the death sentence on youthful offenders, see Pultz, Children and the
Death Penalty, 2 PRISON L. MONITOR 205 (1980).
6. W. BOWERS, ExEcUTIONS IN AMERICA 200 (1974) (an analysis of every execution in the
United States between 1864 and 1967).
7. The maximum sentence that may be imposed by a juvenile court is detention of the
offender until age of majority. See Feld, Reference of Juvenile Offenders for Adult Prosecution: The Legislative Alternative to Asking Unanswerable Questions, 62 MINN. L. REV. 515,
524 (1978); Gasper & Kafkin, A Rationale for the Abolition of the Juvenile Court's Power to
Waive Jurisdiction, 7 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 937, 941 (1980).
8. See AMERICAN JUSTICE INSTITUTE, REPORTS OF THE NATIONAL JUSTICE JUVENILE ASSESSMENT
CENTERS, A NATIONAL ASSESSMENT OF SERIOUS JUVENILE CRIME AND THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM:
THE NEED FOR A RATIONAL RESPONSE 149-97 (1979) [hereinafter cited as AMERICAN JUSTICE
INSTITUTE]. Even those minors transferred into the adult criminal system are provided with
some special protections. For example, states often list an offender's age and emotional maturity
as mitigating factors that must bc considered before imposing the death sentence. See FLA.
STAT. § 921.141(6)(b) & (g) (1981).
9. See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 556-57 (1966) (recognizing the transferred
juvenile's loss of protections). See also Schornhorst, The Waiver of Juvenile Court Jurisdiction,
Kent Revisited, 43 IND. L.J. 583, 586 (1968).
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capital punishment authorize its use upon minors ° and the remaining states
merely require that age be considered a factor militating against imposition
of the death penalty.'1 In contrast, the Model Penal Code' 2 and all European
nations1 3 forbid the execution of children.
Although minors can be sentenced to death in the adult system, such a
sentence seems inconsistent with modem society's concern for the human
dignity of its citizens, especially its youth. The morality of juvenile executions
may be a legislative decision demanding democratic debate, but the constitutional propriety of sentencing minors to death is a judicial function. The
Supreme Court has never resolved this precise issue,14 although numerous decisions have affirmed the constitutionality of the death penalty as applied to
adults.' 5
This note examines whether a distinction between juvenile and adult
offenders should be made when considering the validity of capital punishment.
An overview of the various procedural means to transfer juvenile cases into
the adult criminal system predicates the constitutional analysis of juvenile
convictions. The constitutionality of juvenile capital punishment is gauged
e
by the eighth amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment'
10. Several states have a death penalty but prohibit its imposition upon persons under
18 years of age. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.5 (West Supp. 1981); COLO. REv. STAT.
§ 16-11-103(5)(a) (1978); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-46a(f)(1) (West Supp. 1981); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 38, § 9-1(b) (Smith-Hurd 1981). NEv. Rxv. STAT. § 176.025 (1979) prohibits capital
punishment of persons less than 16 years old.
11. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13a-5-36(7) (Supp. 1981); Amz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(g)(5)
(Supp. 1979); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-1304 (1977); MD. CODE ANN. § 413(g)(5) (1982); MAss. GEM.
LAws ANN. ch. 279, § 55(b)(5) (West Supp. 1981); Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-19-101(6)(g) (Supp.
1982); NEB. Rv. STAT. § 29-2523(2)(d) (1979); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15a-2000(0(7) (1978); UTAH
CODE ANN.

§ 76-3-207(1)(e) (1978).

12. MODE. PENAL CODE § 210.6(1)(d) (1980).
13. See E. CALVERT, supra note 1, at 45-90. See generally Patrick, The Status of Capital
Punishment: A World Perspective,56 J. CRnm. L., CRIMINOLOGY & PoLic Sci. 397 (1965) (noting
that 70 jurisdictions in the world have abolished capital punishment). Further, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16), at 52, U.N.
Doc. A/6316 (1966), signed by President Carter and pending before the Senate, expressly provides that "a sentence of death shall not be imposed for crimes committed by persons below
eighteen years of age." Capital Punishment; Juveniles, 50 U.S.L.W. 3363 (Nov. 10, 1981).
14. The United States Supreme Court did grant certiorari to determine whether the
eighth and fourteenth amendments prohibit the use of capital punishment upon minors
in the recent case of Eddings v. Oklahoma, 450 U.S. 1040 (1981), but the case was ultimately
decided on other grounds. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982). See infra text accompanying notes 131-146.
15. See, e.g., Proffitt v. Florida, 428 US. 242 (1976) (finding constitutional Florida's
capital punishment statute specifying the use of a bifurcated trial and sentencing system);
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (upholding Georgia's death penalty statute providing
for a bifurcated sentencing structure). But see, e.g., Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 US. 325 (1976)
(holding a mandatory death penalty statute unconstitutional under the eighth amendment);
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 US. 280 (1976) (invalidating a mandatory death penalty
statute on eighth amendment grounds); Furman v. Georgia, 408 US. 238 (1972) (declaring unconstitutional a capital punishment statute granting the jury unbridled discretion in determining whether to impose the death penalty).
16. The eighth amendment provides that: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor
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JUVENILE VS. CRIMINAL COURT JURISDICTION:
WAIVER MECHANISMS

Society has long recognized that a distinction between adults and juveniles
7
is necessary when considering the appropriate penalty for criminal behavior.'
In the late nineteenth century, a movement began to prevent the imposition
of adult punishments upon minors.'8 This movement culminated in the
creation of the first juvenile court designed to meet the special needs of
juvenile offenders.' 9 Today, every state has a juvenile court system that
separately processes youthful offenders. 20 The goal of the juvenile justice
system is to rehabilitate the offender through individualized treatment. -1 Such
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend.
VIII.
17. See Fox, Philosophy and the Principles of Punishment in the Juvenile Court, 8
FAMILY L.Q. 373, 373 (1974). The author cites a recent pronouncement of the National
Council of Juvenile Court Judges: "[T]he basic premise of juvenile court jurisdiction [is]
that children are different from adults and deserve not only due process protection but also
the benefit of individualized dispositions based on the needs of the child which are and
have been the hallmark of the juvenile court." Id. See also Renn, The Right to Treatment and the Juvenile, 19 CRIME &cDELINQ. 477, 481 (1973) ("Children are not tried in the
same courts nor according to the same substantive law as adults."). See generally LEVIN &
JUVENILE DELINQUENCY:
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF LEGAL CODES IN THE UNITED
STATES (National Assessment of Juvenile Corrections, 1974) [hereinafter cited as JUVENILE
DELINQUENCY]. The authors examine juvenile treatment in the United States by comparing
SARRI,

the juvenile delinquency acts of each state. Each state statute expressly provides for a separate
sentencing process to be used in the correction of juvenile offenders.
18. See Gasper & Katkin, supra note 7, at 937-38. See also In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 15 (1967)
(severe injustice in exposing children to "long prison sentences and . . . hardened criminals').
19. Illinois was the first state to establish a separate juvenile court to process delinquent
youths. Act of April 21, 1899, 1899 ILL. LAWS 131. For a discussion of the ideological underpinnings behind the formation of this court, see Schultz, The Cycle of Juvenile Court History,
19 CRIME & DELINQ. 457, 476 (1973). See also Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104,
119 (1909) (emphasizing the need for patient, understanding, and experienced juvenile court
judges).
There have been conflicting interpretations as to the precise development of this juvenile
justice system. Compare A. PLATr, THE CHILDSAVERS: THE EMERGENCE OF THE JUVENILE COURT
IN CHICAGO 4 (1968) (describing the "child savers" movement and the emergence of a separate

juvenile justice system as a "matter of conscience and morality" for reformers who believed
they were "rescuing children from a degrading way of life") with Fox, Juvenile Justice Reform: An Historical Perspective, 22 STAN. L. REv. 1187, 1221-22 (1970) (challenging Platt's
observations and concluding that there was "little actual use of oppressive criminal pro-

cedures in juvenile cases" and that there is no "evidence of a reform movement devoted
in whole, or in part, to ending the application of adult criminal procedures to children.').
20. See JUVENILE DELINQUENCY, supra note 17, at 10; Simpson, Rehabilitation as the
Justification of a Separate Juvenile Justice System, 64 CAL. L. REV. 984, 984 (1976).
21. See Peuler, Juveniles Tsied as Adults: Waiver of Juvenile Court Jurisdiction, 3 J.
CONTEMP. L. 349, 349 (1977). The juvenile justice system has often been criticized for failing
to achieve the rehabilitative ideal upon which it was founded. This criticism is supported by

continuing high crime rates and increasing recidivism rates among juveniles. See, e.g., Renn,
supra note

17,

at 477

(high rate

of recidivism

illustrates

that juvenile

courts

have

been unsuccessful in rehabilitating juveniles); Simpson, supra note 20, at 987-88 ("In 1973,
23 percent of all persons arrested for violent crimes and 51 percent of those arrested for
major crimes against property were under age 18."); Morgan, They Think, "I Can Kill Because
I'm 14", N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 1975, at 11 (remarking that "[a] 14-year-old knows the worst
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a system is justified by the parens patriae doctrine, which presumes the immaturity and lesser culpability of minors.22
The protection of the juvenile court, however, is not extended to all
children charged with violating the law. Criminally sophisticated youths who
commit serious offenses will be subject to trial as adult criminal defendants
under certain circumstances. 23 For this group of serious juvenile offenders, 24
prosecution is essentially a two-step process consisting of a waiver hearing to
determine the appropriate forum for decision and an adjudication on the
merits. The choice of forum decision is critically important to the accused
minor. Significant philosophical differences are reflected between the juvenile
system, with its emphasis on individualized treatment, and the adult system
with its emphasis on punishment. A minor becomes susceptible to the death
penalty only when he is transferred into adult court, 25 therefore, an examination of the circumstances under which a minor may be waived into criminal
court is necessary to fully evaluate juvenile capital punishment.
The two preliminary factors that determine whether a minor will be tried
in juvenile or adult criminal court are the age of the accused and the offense
allegedly committed. 6 Every state juvenile act grants the juvenile courts
original jurisdiction over minors between specified ages.27 Most statutes fix the
maximum jurisdictional age at eighteen and the minimum age at seven.28 No
that can happen is 18 months in training school .... He thinks, I can kill because I'm 14. So
you have murderers and rapists returned to the street in no time.').
22. Under the parens patriae doctrine, misbehaving children, lacking maturity and an
adult sense of responsibility, are viewed as needing help rather than punishment by society.
See Allen, The Juvenile Court and the Limits of Juvenile Justice, 11 WAYNE L. REv. 676, 68081 (1965); Handler, The Juvenile Court and the Adversary System: Problems of Function and
Form, 1965 Wis. L. REv. 7, 9-10; Mack, supra note 19, at 104; Note, Rights and Rehabilitation
in the Juvenile Courts, 67 COLUm. L. REv. 281, 282 (1967).
It is generally believed that although children may commit antisocial, violent acts, they
can never truly be "guilty" because guilt presumes maturity and responsibility which minors
do not possess. See W. STAPLETON & L. TEITELBAUM, IN DEFENSE OF YOUTH 9-23 (1972).
23. The mechanism for removing juvenile offenders from the jurisdiction of the
juvenile court for prosecution as adult offenders is known by a variety of terms, including
reference or certification for adult prosecution, waiver, decline, and transfer of juvenile
court jurisdiction. Virtually every jurisdiction permits the prosecution of juveniles in the
adult criminal system. See Alers, Transfer of Jurisdiction From Juvenile to Criminal Court,
19 CrIME & DELINQ. 519, 520-21 (1973).
24. For the purposes of this note a "serious juvenile offender" is a person who has
committed an act of violence resulting in physical harm to the victim (i.e., murder, rape,
assault). A similar distinction between "index" and "non-index" offenders has been suggested
as a means of determining which juveniles should remain within the juvenile system and
which should be transferred into the criminal system. See T. SELLIN & M. WOLFGANG, THE
MEASUREMENT OF DELINQUENCY 295 (2d ed. 1964).
25. See supra notes 7-11 and accompanying text.
26. See Sargent & Gordon, Waiver of Jurisdiction.An Evaluation of the Process in the
Juvenile Court, 9 CRIME & DELiNQ. 121, 122-23 (1963); Stamm, Transfer of Jurisdiction in
Juvenile Court: An Analysis of the Proceeding, Its Role in the Administration of Justice, and
a Proposalfor the Reform of Kentucky Law, 62 Ky. L.J. 122, 141 (1973).
27. AMmICAN JUSTICE INSTITUTE, supra note 8, at 94.
28. These states include: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, California, Delaware, Florida,
Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada,
New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode
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child below the minimum age of culpability 29 can be held criminally liable,
and a youth above the maximum age must be tried as an adult. Minors between the statutorily mandated ages are subject to the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the juvenile courts.30 Some of these youthful offenders are
thought to be either so dangerous that the community must be protected from
theme' or so intractable that it is wasteful to expend the limited resources of
the juvenile justice system on their care and treatment.3 2 Jurisdiction over
such juveniles can be transferred to criminal court by three types of waiver:
33
judicial, legislative, and prosecutorial.
Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin,
Wyoming. Id. at 99-100.
Other states fix the maximum age at 16 or 17 and the minimum age at 10. Specifically,
Colorado and Mississippi set the juvenile court jurisdiction at the minimum age of 10 and the
maximum age at 18; Georgia, Illinois, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri and
South Carolina have jurisdictional ages of 7 and 17; Connecticut, New York and North
Carolina define ages of 7 and 16 as their jurisdictional limits; Texas fixes the age of 10 as
minimum and 17 as the maximum; and Vermont allows juvenile court jurisdiction over
children 10-16. Id.
29. The age of culpability is defined as "the jurisdictional age at which a child is deemed
capable of receiving a death penalty." Savitz, supra note 7, at 355. At common law the age
of culpability is seven, and those states not specifying a minimum age use this common law
jurisdictional limit. Id.
30. In 41 jurisdictions, the jurisdiction of the juvenile court is exclusive, but in 10

jurisdictions, jurisdiction is "concurrent" with the criminal court. See
STITUTE, supra note 8, at 104.

AMERICAN JUSTICE IN-

31. Several juvenile courts justify the waiver of certain minors into the adult system as
necessary to satisfy society's demand for retribution and protection. See THE PRESIDENT'S
COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT & AD. OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: JUVENILE DELINQUENCY
& YOUTH CRIME 24-25 (1967). However, because of the apparent inability to predict accurately which persons are presently or potentially dangerous to society, the use of this
factor as a basis for imprisonment has been heavily criticized. See, e.g., N. MORRIS, THE FUTURE
OF IMPRISONMENT 62 (1974) (suggesting that identification of dangerousness "presupposes a
capacity to predict future criminal behavior quite beyond our present technical ability");
Ennis & Litwack, Psychiatry and the Presumption of Expertise: Flipping Coins in the Courtroom, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 693, 711-16 (1974) (quoting an earlier observation of a psychiatrist
that "even with the most careful, painstaking, laborious, and lengthy clinical approach to the
prediction of dangerousness, false positives may be at a minimum of 60 to 70%."); Morris,
The Future of Imprisonment: Toward a Punitive Philosophy, 72 MICH. L. REv. 1161, 1164
(1974) ("dangerousness as a predictor of future criminality is an unjust basis for imprisoning ... "); Schlesinger, The Prediction of Dangerousness in Juveniles: A Replication, 24 CRIME
& DELINQ. 40, 46 (1978) (noting "insignificant" statistical correlation between prediction of
violent behavior and its actual incidence). But see Kozol, Boucher & Garofalo, The Diagnosis
and Treatment of Dangerousness, 18 CRIME & DELINQ. 371, 372 (1972) (stating that clinical
psychiatrists can reliably and effectively diagnose dangerousness in criminal offenders).
32. These juveniles are typically older delinquents nearing the maximum age for juvenile
court jurisdiction, or they are recidivists whose successful treatment during minority may not
be feasible. See Keiter, Criminal or Delinquent? A Study of Juvenile Cases Transferred to
the Criminal Court, 19 CRIME & DELINQ. 528, 531 (1973); Schornhorst, supra note 9, at 592;
Note, Problem of Age and Jurisdiction in the Juvenile Court, 19 VAND. L. REv. 833, 858

(1966).
33. See Schornhorst, supra note 9, at 596. It was Schornhorst who first coined the terms
"judicial," "legislative," and "prosecutorial" to describe the three forms of waiver. For further
discussion of waiver mechanisms, see generally Stamm, supra note 26; Whitebread & Batey,
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Judicial Waiver
The most prevalent form of waiver vests the power to determine jurisdiction in the juvenile court.3 4 The waiver decision is placed within the discretion of the juvenile court judge. 5 Although state statutes often provide
guidelines for consideration, 6 judges usually emphasize five factors: (1) the
youth's age, (2) the dangerousness of the youth, (3) the seriousness of the
present offense, (4) the seriousness and persistence of criminal activity as reflected in the prior record, and (5) the youth's treatment prognosis.7
Transfer Between Courts: Proposals of the Juvenile Justice Standards Project, 63 VA. L. REv.

221 (1977).
34. Forty-six states and the federal courts employ judicial waiver in some or all transfer
decisions. In other states and the District of Columbia, judicial waiver is the exclusive
mechanism for transferring juveniles into adult criminal court. See, e.g., Am. CONST. art. VI,
§ 15 (1982); 18 U.S.C. § 5032 (1976); ALA. CODE § 12-15-33 (1975); ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.060
(Supp. 1979); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 701-.1 (West Supp. 1981); HAWAI REV. STAT. § 571.22
IDAHO CODE § 16-1806 (Supp. 1982); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, § 702-7 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1981);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-808 (Supp. 1981); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 119, § 61 (Michie/Law. Co-op
Supp. 1982); MicH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 712A.4 (West Supp. 1981); MINN. STAT. § 260.125
(1980); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 211.071 (Vernon 1959); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:4-48 (West Supp. 1981);
N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-14-27 to -27.1 (Supp. 1976); N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-34 (1979 & Supp.
1981); OHo REv. CODE ANN. § 2151.26 (Supp. 1980); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1112 (West
Supp. 1981); OR. REv. STAT. § 419.533 (1981); S.C. CODE ANN. § 14-21-510(C) (Law. Co-op Supp.
1980); S.D. Conrm LAws ANN. § 26-11-4 (Supp. 1982); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-234 (Supp.
1982); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 13.04.120 (1962).
35.

See Browne, Guidelines for Statutes for Transfer of Juveniles to Criminal Court, 4

PEPPERDimE L. REV. 479, 481 (1977); Sorrentino & Oisen, Certification of Juveniles to Adult
Courts, 4 PEPPEIMINE L. Rzv. 497, 504 (1977).

36. State statutes usually enumerate the factors judges are to consider when making a
waiver decision. Authorities indicate, however, that judges consider additional relevant factors
in making waiver decisions. See generally Advisory Council of Judges, National Council on
Crime and Delinquency, Transfer of Cases Between Juvenile and Criminal Courts: A
Policy Statement, 8 CRIME & DELiNQ. 3 (1962) (observing that juvenile court judges usually

consider any relevant factor bearing on the youth's fitness to remain in the juvenile system);
Comment, Juvenile Court Waiver: The Questionable Validity of Existing Statutory
Standards, 16 ST. Louis U.L.J. 604 (1972) (delineating the vast amount of information relied

upon by judges in reaching a waiver decision).
37. Reliance on these five factors resulted from the Supreme Court's listing of appropriate factors for consideration in Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 566-67 (1966):
The determinative factors which will be considered by the Judge in deciding whether
the Juvenile Court's jurisdiction over such offenses will be waived are the following:
1. The seriousness of the alleged offense to the community and whether the protection of the community requires waiver.
2. Whether the alleged offense was committed in an aggressive, violent, premeditated or willful manner.
3. Whether the alleged offense was against persons or against property, greater
weight being given to offenses against persons especially if personal injury resulted.
4.

The prosecutive merit of the complaint ....

5. The desirability of trial and disposition of the entire offense in one court when
the juvenile's associates in the alleged offense are adults ....

6. The sophistication and maturity of the juvenile as determined by consideration
of his home, environmental situation, emotional attitude and pattern of living.
7. The record and previoup history of tie juvenile ....

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol35/iss2/7
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States' waiver provisions enumerate these five factors with varying degrees
of specificity. The importance of the age factor is reflected in a number of
statutes that establish a minimum age below which a child cannot be tried as
an adult

5

State statutes are generally less precise with respect to the other

four factors. Some statutes provide only minimal guidance, authorizing waiver
if a youth is found not suitable for treatment or his retention within the
juvenile system poses a threat to the public safety. 39 Other statutes offer greater
direction by obligating the judge to consider the offender's amenability to
treatment within the time remaining for juvenile court jurisdiction, 4 0 the
success of prior treatment efforts, 41 or the possibility of civil commitment as an
alternative to waiver. 42 The dangerousness criterion is addressed indirectly
by requiring the judiciary to examine the circumstances and seriousness of the
present offense, 4 3 the juvenile's prior record, 4 4 and the public safety."5 In

8. The prospects for adequate protection of the public and the likelihood of reasonable rehabilitation of the juvenile.
38. A few states permit waiver at any age. See ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.060 (1975 & Supp.
1979); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-807 (1980). Most states, however, establish some
type of minimum age requirement. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, § 702-7(3) (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1981) (age 13); IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.72 (West 1969) (age 14 at time of the commission
of crime); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-808 (Supp. 1981) (age 16 at time of conduct); LA. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 13.1570(A)(5) (West Supp. 1981) (age 15 at time of charge); MINN. STAT. § 609.055
(1980) (age 14 at time of conduct); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.18 ('West 1979 & Supp. 1981) (age 16
when charged). Sevcral states have different minimum age requirements for nonserious and
serious offenses, with a lower minimum for serious offenses. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 24A2501(a)(4) (1981) (capital crimes at age 13; all others at age 15); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 211.071
(Vernon 1962) (transfer for felonies if over 14; all other crimes transfer at 17-21).
39. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 707-.1 (West Supp. 1981) (authorizing waiver
if factors "indicate a relatively poor prognosis for rehabilitation"); MINN. STAT. § 260.125(2)(d)
(1980) (authorizing waiver if the court "finds that . . . the child is not suitable to treatment
or that the public safety is not served under the provisions of laws relating to juvenile
courts.").
40. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.060(d) (Supp. 1979) ("cannot be rehabilitated by treatment under this chapter before he reaches 20 years of age."); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:4-48(c)
(West Supp. 1981) ("[N]o reasonable prospects for rehabilitation of the juvenile prior to his
attaining the age of majority by use of the procedures, services and facilities available to the
court.").
41. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 12-15-34(d)(3) (1975) ("the nature of past treatment efforts and
the nature of the child's response o such efforts"); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 938(c)(4) (Supp.
1980) (" [w]hether the child has previously been subjected to any form of correctional treatment by the Family Court"); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-234(b)(2) (Supp. 1982) ("[t]he nature of
past treatment efforts and the nature of the child's response thereto").
42. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 12-15-34(c) (1975) ("[w]hen there are grounds to believe that the
child is committable to an institution or agency for the mentally retarded or mentally ill,
the court shall proceed as provided in § 12-15-70"); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-234(a)(4)(ii) (Supp.
ill").
43. See, e.g., FLA. STAr. § 39.09(2)(c)(2)-(3) (1981) ("[w]hether the alleged offense was
committed in an aggressive, violent, premeditated, or willful manner" and "[w]hether the
alleged offense was against persons or against property, greater weight being given to offenses
against persons, especially if personal injury resulted"); Act of Sept. 20, 1977, § 1, ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 37, § 702-7(3)(a)(2) (Smith-Hurd. Supp. 1981) ("whether there is evidence that the
alleged offense was committed in an aggressive and premeditated manner").
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addition, numerous jurisdictions require consideration of other factors such
as the child's demeanor, home environment, living patterns, and attitude. 46
State legislatures that have specified the factors to be considered in a waiver
decision have typically enumerated those factors disjunctively without assigning controlling weight to any one factor. 47 Thus, judges are given wide discretion in determining which youths shall be transferred into the criminal
system. 48 This broad discretion has caused judicial waiver statutes to come
under sharp attack from both courts and commentators. 49
In Kent v. United States,50 the Supreme Court acknowledged the tre44. See, e.g., Act of Sept. 20, 1977, § 1, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, § 702(3)(a)(4) (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1981) ("previous history of the minor"); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-808(b)(5) (Supp. 1981)
("record and previous history of the child"); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-234(b)(1) (Supp. 1982)
("extent and nature of the child's prior delinquency records"). An extensive delinquency
record, however, may indicate both dangerousness and a need for treatment.
45. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 12-15-34(d)(6) (1975) ("interests of the community and of the
child requiring that the child be placed under legal restraint or discipline'); ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 37, § 702-7(3)(a)(6) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1981) ("whether the best interest of the minor
and the security of the public may require that the minor continue in custody').
46. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 12-15-34(d)(4)-(5) (1975) ("[d]emeanor; . . . [and] [t]he extent
and nature of the child's physical and mental maturity'); FLA. STAT. § 39.09(2)(c)(6) (1981)
("It]he sophistication and maturity of the child, as determined by consideration of his home,
environmental situation, emotional attitude, and pattern of living").
47. Some courts, however, have held that certain factors, taken in isolation and without
reference to a youth's treatment potential are insufficient to justify waiver. See Jimmy H. v.
Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 709, 718, 478 P.2d 32, 35, 91 Cal. Rptr. 600, 603 (1970) (court
must consider more than circumstances surrounding the offense itself). But see Mikulovsky v.
State, 54 Wis. 2d 699, 708, 196 N.W.2d 748, 753 (1972) (waiver decision based solely on the
seriousness of the offense).
48. Both appellate courts and legislatures typically refrain from specifying the determinative factors a waiving court must consider or assigning those factors relative weight. See, e.g.,
Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 537 (1975) ("mhe Court has never attempted to prescribe
criteria for, or the nature and quantum of evidence that must support, a decision to transfer
a juvenile for trial in adult court."); Juvenile v. Commonwealth, 370 Mass, 272, 282, 347
N.E.2d 677, 684 (1976) ("There is no specific requirement that a judge weigh these factors in
a certain manner or achieve some predesigned balance.").
49. Numerous studies indicate that a judge's personal beliefs are all too often the paramount determinant in waiver decisions. See, e.g., W. STAPLETON & L. TSTELBAUM, supra note
22, at 105-06 (noting that a particular judge may find certain types of crime especially onerous,
and thus waive youths accused of such crimes when other juvenile judges would have been
willing to retain jurisdiction); Duffee & Siegel, The Organization Man: Legal Counsel in the

Juvenile Court, 7 CRIm. L. BULL. 544 (1971) (suggesting that "conservative law and order
judges" tend to waive youths with greater frequency than their liberal counterparts).
Political pressure on the state judiciary often forces a judge to waive a delinquent into
criminal court to demonstrate responsiveness to the public's concern about youthful crime.
See Sargent & Gordon, supra note 26, at 125 (contending that when children commit violent
crimes, strong community pressure is brought to bear upon the judge to send the child to
criminal court). Other commentators have noted that interorganizational pressures may also
require judges to waive juvenile offenders in the criminal system. See, e.g., A. CIcouREL, THE
SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF JUvENILE JUSTICE 220 (1976) (influence of policemen and probation
officers); R. EMESsoN, JUDGING DELINQUENTS: CONTEXT AND PROCESS IN JUVENILE COURT 12-15

(1969) (finding that the juvenile court is susceptible to pressure from law enforcement
agencies).
50. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
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mendous potential for abuse under judicial waiver statutes. Recognizing the
importance of the waiver decision, 51 the Court determined that minimum due
process standards must be met before courts can transfer youths to criminal
court. 52 Specifically, the majority held that waiver proceedings must afford the
accused an opportunity to a hearing, assistance of counsel, access to social investigations and other records, and written factual and legal conclusions
capable of review by a higher court. 53 The Court limited juvenile judges' discretion to statutory waiver schemes that provide sufficient procedural regularity to satisfy the basic clue process fairness requirement and to prevent
5 4
arbitrary procedure.
Although the Court was construing a District of Columbia statute, Kent, 55
when read in conjunction with subsequent opinions, s 6 has been viewed as establishing a constitutional requirement of procedural due process in judicial
waiver proceedings. 57 A minority of courts reject the constitutional dimensions
of Kent, however, and either distinguish the decision or limit it to its facts. 58
Consequently, in some jurisdictions juvenile courts retain the unbridled dis-

51. Id. at 553-54.
52. Id. at 554. Although the Court stated that full procedural due process protections
were not required in waiver decisions, it declared that "there is no place in our system of law
for reaching a result of such tremendous consequences without ceremony- without hearing,
without effective assistance of counsel, without a statement of reasons." Id.
53. Id. at 554-57. See generally Paulsen, Kent v. United States: The Constitutional
Context of Juvenile Cases, 1966 StP. CT. REV. 167 (analyzing the procedural requirements of
Kent).
54. 383 U.S. at 553.
55. Justice Fortas, writing for the majority, stated that the conclusions of Kent were
based upon a reading of the District of Columbia statute "in the context of constitutional
principles relating to due process and the assistance of counsel." Id. at 557. See D.C. CODE
ANN. § 11-1553 (1965) which requires a "full investigation" before waiver into the adult
system. The Court held this statute mandates a hearing and that the juvenile's counsel
have access to all juvenile court records.
56. See, e.g., Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975) (because jeopardy attaches to juvenile
court proceedings to bar subsequent criminal reprosecution as an adult under the fifth
amendment, courts must determine whether to transfer an offender before proceeding against
him); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (holding that juveniles have a right to notice of
charges, counsel, confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses, and privileges against
self-incrimination).
57. See Paulsen, supra note 53, at 167; Comment, ProsecutorialDiscretion and the Decision to Waive Juvenile Court Jurisdiction, 1973 WASH. U.L.Q. 436, 439 n.17. But see Recent
Developments, Juvenile Court- The District of Columbia Waiver of Jurisdiction Statute Statutory Due Process, 12 How. L.j. 360, 366 (1966) (limiting Kent on the ground that it was
based on the particular District of Columbia statute); Notes and Comments, Separating the
Criminal From the Delinquent: Due Process in Certification Procedure, 40 S.CAL. L. REV. 158,
161-62 (1967) (suggesting the lack of a constitutional basis for Kent).
58. See, e.g., Stanley v. Peyton, 292 F. Supp. 209, 211 (W.D. Va. 1968) (declaring Kent is
not of constitutional dimensions); In re Harris, 67 Cal. 2d 876, 879, 434 P.2d 615, 617, 64 Cal.
Rptr. 319, 321 (1967) (finding Kent of constitutional dimensions but limiting it to its facts);
State v. Acuna, 78 N.M. 119, 121, 428 P.2d 658, 660 (1967) (finding Kent inapplicable because
it was based on the D.C. statute); Knott v. Langlois, 102 R.I. 517, 522, 231 A.2d 767, 769 (1967)
(following Kent only because of the similarity of Rhode Island's waiver statute to the
District of Columbia's statute).
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cretion to determine which minors should be denied the rehabilitative care
of juvenile justice and should instead be subjected to the adult system.59
Legislative Waiver
Because judicial waiver is controversial, several state legislatures have
abandoned it and enacted legislative waiver statutes. 60 Certain categories of
offenses are simply excluded from juvenile court jurisdiction by legislative
definition. 61 If charged with one of the enumerated offenses, youths above a
statutory minimum age are treated as adults. 62 These statutes appear to limit
the possibilities for discretionary decisionmaking. Because legislative waiver
statutes focus entirely on the offense rather than individual characteristics of
the offender, this approach has been criticized as inconsistent with the rehabilitative philosophy of the juvenile system. 63 Legislative waiver statutes
59. See, e.g., Hall v. State, 284 Ala. 569, 570-71, 226 So. 2d 630, 631 (1969) (the only findings required of a juvenile judge are that the defendant is a delinquent and could not be
made to live a correct life); Eyman v. Superior Court, 9 Ariz. App. 6, 13-14, 448 P.2d 878, 885
(1968) (reasons for waiver need not be set out in a written order by judge); Neller v. State,
79 N.M. 528, 445 P.2d 949 (1968) (upholding validity of waiver hearing in which defendant
had no attorney, was not apprised of his constitutional rights, and called no witnesses); State
v. Williams, 75 Wash. 2d 604, 605, 453 P.2d 418, 419 (1969) (considering testimony of police
and youth's confession, prior record and age before waiver); State v. Piche, 74 Wash. 2d 9, 14,
442 P.2d 632, 635-36 (waiver hearing is to be informal, without benefit of rules of evidence
or procedure), cert. denied sub nom., 393 U.S. 969 (1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1041 (1969).
60. This rejection of judicial waiver is largely attributable to the effect of Kent v. United
States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966). See supra text accompanying notes 50-56.
61. For an exhaustive analysis of the legislative waiver statute, see Whitebread & Batey,
supra note 33, at 221. See also State v. G.A., 417 So. 2d 981 (Fla. 1982).
62. Most states employing legislative waiver provide for the transfer of youths above 14
years of age who commit capital crimes. See, e.g., COLO. Rav. STAT. §§ 19-1-103(9), -104, -3-108
(1973 9- Supp. 1982) (14 years or older); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 938(c) (Supp. 1982) (16
years and older); FLA. STAT. § 39.02(5)(c) (1981) (14 or older); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6302 (1978)
(18 years or older). Other jurisdictions exclude broader categories of offenses. See, e.g., D.C.
CODE ANN. § 16-2301(3) (1973) (youths convicted of enumerated crimes may be transferred to
adult court); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:1570A(5) (West 1968 & Supp. 1982) (allowing transfer
of youths 15 years or older convicted of first degree murder, second degree murder, manslaughter, aggravated rape; transfer of children 16 years and above convicted of armed
robbery, aggravated burglary, or aggravated kidnapping); RI. GEN. LAws § 14-1-7.1 (Supp.
1980) (youths charged with repeat offenses may be transferred to adult court).
63. See Emerson, Role Determinants in Juvenile Court, in HANDBOOK OF CRZIMNOLOGY
621, 631-38 (3d ed. 1974) (questioning the rationality of distinguishing first offenders on the
basis of seriousness of offense alone); Mountford & Berenson, Waiver of Jurisdiction:The Last
Resort of the Juvenile Court, 18 U. KAN. L. Rv. 55, 62 (1969) (criticizing the mandatory
waiver of youths). See generally Mack, supra note 19, at 110 (specifically rejecting the use of
mandatory waiver statutes); Note, Youthful Offenders and Adult Courts: ProsecutorialDis.
cretion v. Juvenile Rights, 121 U. PA. L. Rv. 1184, 1193 (1973) (criticizing the lack of
individualized consideration of juveniles before waiver).
Congress has also criticized legislative waiver provisions through the reports of task forces
formed to address juvenile crime. The National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice
Standards and Goals specifically rejected legislative waiver as a solution to increasing
juvenile crime. See AMEmCAN JUsTI E INsrrruTE, supra note 8, at 18. The Advisory Commission
recommended that a mandatory waiver hearing be held before any minor is placed into the
adult criminal system. Id. Similarly, the Task Force on Juvenile Justice and Delinquency
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64
have also been challenged on due process and equal protection grounds.
The due process criticism challenges the unreviewability of the prosecutor's
charging decision and the absence of Kent protections. The equal protection
claim questions the rationality of the legislative decision to treat youths
charged with certain offenses as adults rather than juveniles.
The leading decision on the validity of legislative waiver is United States
v. Bland.65 In Bland, a sixteen-year-old youth was charged with armed robbery
and tried as an adult. 6 The defendant asserted that the Kent procedural
safeguards were required by the due process clause as a precondition of waiver
because of the critical nature of waiver decisions. 67 The court, however, rejected the contention that prosecutors' charging decisions under legislative
waiver statutes should be subject to the same procedural safeguards as those
68
afforded judicial waiver decisions.
In refusing to incorporate procedural requirements into legislative waiver
statutes,6 9 the majority relied upon the established doctrine that prosecutorial
discretion is generally not subject to judicial review or due process constraints.70 The court noted that this doctrine, based on the principle of

Prevention rejected legislative waiver provisions and suggested that courts employ the least
restrictive alternative available in sentencing juveniles. See AMERICAN JUSTICE INSTITUTE,
REPORTS
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(1979).

Accord State v. Kiser, 194 Neb. 513, 514, 233 N.W.2d 571, 571 (1975) ("the defendant's youth
would indicate the sentence should be something less than the statutory maximum.").
64. See Woodard v. Wainwright, 556 F.2d 781, 783-85 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 1088 (1978); Russell v. Parratt, 534 F.2d 1214, 1215 (8th Cir. 1976); United States
v. Quinones, 516 F.2d 1309, 1311 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 852 (1975); Cox v. United
States, 473 F.2d 334, 336 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 869 (1973).
65. 472 F.2d 1329 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 909 (1973).
66. Id. at 1331.
67. Id. at 1336 & n.20. The district court had granted defendant's motion to dismiss the
indictment for lack of jurisdiction, finding that the statutory waiver provision violated procedural due process. Id. at 1331.
68. Id. at 1336 n.26. For a discussion of this contention and the Bland decision, see
Vitiello, Constitutional Safeguards for Juvenile Transfer Procedure: The Ten Years Since
Kent v. United States, 26 DE PAUL L. REv. 23, 47-52 (1976); Note, Sending the Accused
Juvenile to Adult Criminal Court: A Due Process Analysis, 42 BROOKLYN L .REv. 309, 342
(1975); Note, Due Process and Waiver of Juvenile Court Jurisdiction,30 WASH. & LEE L. REv.
591, 601-07 (1973).
69. 472 F.2d at 1335-36.
70. The prosecutorial discretion attacked in Bland was the prosecutor's decision as to
what charge should be brought against the juvenile. This type of discretion is distinguished
from "pure prosecutorial discretion" which allows the prosecutor, rather than the legislature
or court, to make an independent determination as to which youths should be transferred into
adult court. "Pure" discretion is authorized under prosecutorial waiver statutes. See infra
notes 75-78 and accompanying text. In either case, the waiver decision is controlled by the
prosecutor. This control is manifested directly through either the prosecutor's choice of
forum or indirectly through his decision to bring a certain charge. For an analysis of the
scope of this traditional discretion, see Note, Reviewability of ProsecutorialDiscretion: Failure
to Prosecute, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 130, 140-46 (1975) (judicial reluctance to encumber the
prosecutor's discretion stems from a fear of intruding on sensitive legal and policy judgments);
Note, ProsecutorialDiscretion - A Re-evaluation of the Prosecutor's Unbridled Discretionand
Its Potential for Abuse, 21 DE PAUL L. REv. 485, 489-90 (1971) (prosecutors' decisions con-
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separation of powers, limits review of prosecutors' discretionary decisions to
cases involving factors such as "race, religion, or other arbitrary classification[S]." 71 Since none of these suspect factors was present in Bland, the majority concluded that the prosecutor's exercise of discretion did not violate due
72
process or equal protection of the law.
Although numerous commentators argue that the similar consequences
flowing from legislative and judicial waivers necessitate comparable procedural safeguards, 73 courts have uniformly rejected such claims and upheld
the validity of legislative waiver statutes.74 Discrimination between serious and
minor offenders is justified by the belief that serious offenders are beyond
the rehabilitative reach of the juvenile court or that their presence within
5
the juvenile justice system is detrimental to the rehabilitation of others7

ProsecutorialWaiver
The third statutory mechanism used to place youthful offenders into the
adult system is the prosecutorial waiver. Although legislative waiver gives
prosecutors indirect control over transfers through their charging decision,
prosecutorial waiver gives prosecutors the direct option of filing charges against
a youth in either juvenile or criminal court.78 Prosecutorial waiver statutes
cerning whether and when to prosecute are beyond review of the courts); Note, Prosecutor's
Discretion, 103 U. PA. L. REV. 1057, 1080-81 (1955) (noting the ineffectiveness of methods
available to control prosecutorial discretion and suggesting possible solutions to improve the
degree of restraint over prosecutorial decision-making).
71. 472 F.2d at 1335-36.
72. Id. at 1337. In dissent, Judge Skelley Wright argued that procedural protections
should be imposed upon legislative waiver provisions. Id. at 1345 (quoting Goldberg v.
Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262-63 (1970)). According to Judge Wright, statutes that systematically
exclude certain youths from juvenile court jurisdiction are mere subterfuges to evade the
procedural requirements of Kent. Id. at 1341. To avoid this result, prosecutors' charging decisions should be subjected to the same type of hearing required in cases of judicial waiver.
Id. at 1344.
73. See, e.g., Cox, ProsecutorialDiscretion:An Overview, 13 Am. Cm. L. REy. 383, 39497 (1976); LaFave, The Prosecutor'sDiscretion in the United States, 18 Am. J. CoMP. L. 532,
536-39 (1970). See generally Note, Waiver of Juvenile Jurisdiction and the Hard-Core Youth,
51 N.D.L. REv. 655, 662-64 (1975) (criticizing the Bland majority for permitting the legislature
to circumvent Kent waiver procedures).
74. See, e.g., Cox v. United States, 473 F.2d 334, 335 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 869
(1973) (upholding prosecutorial decision to charge under legislative waiver statutes); Newman
v. United States, 382 F.2d 479, 482 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (relying upon separation of power
principle); Johnson v. State, 314 So. 2d 573, 577 (Fla. 1975) (refusing to extend procedural requirements into prosecutorial decision). See generally Bordenkircher V. Hayes, 434
U.S. 357, 364-65 (reaffirming the prosecutors' freedom from judicial constraints), reh'g denied,
435 U.S. 918 (1978).
75. As Vitiello observes, however, it is not clear that juveniles who commit serious offenses
are less amenable to treatment than those who commit trivial offenses. In general, courts have
pointed to the seriousness of the offense as indicative of nonamenability without careful
examination of individual cases. The problem appears to be far more complex than courts
have recognized. For example, one study indicated that juvenile murderers are model prisoners and low rate recidivists. Vitiello, supra note 68, at 32-34.
76. Prosecutorial waiver is the least common transfer mechanism, and its use appears to
be in disfavor. Federal delinquency proceedings, which formerly relied upon prosecutorial

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol35/iss2/7

12

Wilson: Juvenile Offenders and the Electric Chair: Curel and Unusual Puni
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[V/ol. XXXV

thus grant prosecutors broad and largely unchecked discretion to determine
77
the appropriate forum.
This form of waiver presumes that the prosecutor's office78 can effectively
and impartially determine which youths should be tried and punished as
adults. Because of the extremely political nature of the prosecutor's office, however, it is questionable whether such impartiality is actually achieved.1 9 In
fact, several recent studies have concluded that social characteristics, particularly race, play a significant role in determining which juvenile offenders
are tried in the adult criminal system. 0 Such conclusions have led to increased
criticism of prosecutorial waiver statutes.8 '
The impact of the waiver decision on juveniles is the same whether the
prosecutor or the judge controls that decision. Therefore, it has been urged
that Kent requires the prosecutor's choice of forum to be restrained by similar
waiver, now employ judicial waiver to deal with serious juvenile offenders. See 18 US.C.
§§ 5031-32 (1976). However, a few states retain prosecutorial waiver. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTIcE,
OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY

PREVENTION, MAJOR ISSUES IN JUVENILE JUSTICE

BETWEEN Two WORLDS 118-19 (1982)
[hereinafter cited as YOUTH IN ADULT COURTS]. See generally Note, supra note 63 (criticizing
prosecutorial waiver statutes because of the absence of guidelines to restrain prosecutor's decision).
77. See Comment, supra note 57, at 441.
78. For a general description of the prosecutor's office, see G. COLE, POLTCS AND T E ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE Ill (19713); J. EISENSTEIN & H. JACOB, FELONY JUsTIcE: AN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS OF CRIMINAL COURTS 45, 48 (1977).
79. It is a political fact that prosecutors must be concerned with their conviction rates.
Therefore, they might be inclined to waive cases to criminal court when their evidence is
strong and leave them in juvenile court when their evidence is weak. Prosecutorial waiver
decisions are thus particularly susceptible to political pressure and pressure from the police
with whom the prosecutor must maintain cordial working relations. See, e.g., R. EMERSON,
supra note 49, at 42-45 (noting that the political nature of the prosecutor's office coupled
with the lack of procedural safeguards results in arbitrary and unfair decisions); J. SKOLNICK,
INFORMATION

JUSTICE

AND TRAINING

-

YOUTH IN

ADULT COURTS:

VITHOUT TRIAL: LAW ENFORCEMENT IN A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY

199 (1966) (recognizing

the policeman's ability to influence prosecutors because "it is hard to say no to a cop').
80. See YOUTH IN ADULT COURTS, supra note 76, at 119-20 (presenting statistical data of
the impact of race, age, and sex upon the prosecutor's transfer decision); Thornberry,
Sentencing Disparities in the Juvenile Justice System, 70 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 164,
170-71 (1979). See also Keiter, supra note 32, at 537 (concluding that prosecutorial decisions
are occasionally rendered in an arbitrary manner but rejecting the assumption that prosecutors are entirely motivated by racial concerns).
Earlier studies had indicated that race and socioeconomic status of the offender were
largely unrelated to the prosecutor's decision. See generally Burke & Turk, Factors Affecting
Post Arrest Dispositions: A Model for Analysis, 22 Soc. PRoBs. 313 (1975); Ferdinand &
Luchterhand, Inner City Youth, the Police, the Juvenile Court and Justice, 17 SoC. PROBS. 510
(1970); Terry, The Screening of Juvenile Offenders, 58 J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE ScI.
173 (1967); Wellford, Labelling Theory and Criminology: An Assessment, 22 Soc. PROBS. 332
(1975).
81. See, e.g., K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 208-15 (1969)
(suggesting the use of precise statutory criteria to limit prosecutorial discretion); Comment,
supra note 57, at 443-44 (criticizing prosecutorial waiver statutes because they lack procedural safeguards). See also Schornhorst, supra note 9, at 598-99 (noting the near absolute
discretion afforded prosecutors under prosecutorial waiver statutes and the attendant potential
for abuse).
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procedural safeguards.8 2 As in legislative waiver cases, however, courts have
rejected such contentions because of the doctrine of prosecutorial discretion
and the narrow focus of Kent. 3 These decisions overlook the fundamental
difference between legislative and prosecutorial waiver.
Under legislative waiver statutes, the legislature establishes the types of
offenses subject to adult court jurisdiction. The legislative classifications are
subject to judicial review8 4 Under prosecutorial waiver statutes, however, the
state legislature authorizes the prosecutor to make the ultimate transfer decision. The prosecutor is thus making decisions which have the same effect
as legislative classifications under legislative waiver statutes, but the prosecutor's decisions are completely unreviewable and often ad hoc. Legislative
classifications may be set aside by courts "if no grounds can be conceived to
justify them."8' 5 The decision of the prosecutor should be subject to the same
minimal standard of review. In this way, courts could ensure that transfer
decisions are rational without offending the principle of separation of powers.
As has been noted, excluding minors from juvenile court jurisdiction
results in their loss of many benefits 6 and subjects minors to much harsher
treatment than they would otherwise have received.8 7 When determining
which procedural rights must be afforded an individual affected by a governmental decision, the Supreme Court has traditionally focused on the importance of the decision to the aggrieved individual rather than the governmental entity making the decision8 8 Under this analysis youthful offenders
82. See Cox v. United States, 473 F.2d 334, 336 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 869
(1973). The Court, however, specificially rejected procedural safeguards as a precondition to
the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, stating: "Judicial proceedings must be clothed in the
raiment of due process, while the processes of prosecutorial decision-making wear very
different garb." 473 F.2d at 336.
83. See, e.g., Myers v. District Court, 184 Colo. 81, 85, 518 P.2d 836, 838 (1974) (upholding
prosecutorial waiver statute); People v. Bombacino, 51 Ill. 2d 17, 20, 280 N.E.2d 697, 699
(limiting Kent to its facts), cert. denied sub nom., Bombacino v. Illinois, 409 U.S. 912 (1972);
Jackson v. State, 311 So. 2d 658, 661 (Miss. 1975) (citing the traditionally wide latitude given
prosecutorial discretion); State v. Lytle, 194 Neb. 353, 363, 231 N.W.2d 681, 688 (1975) (unreviewability of prosecutor's decisions); State v. Grayer, 191 Neb. 523, 525-26, 215 N.W.2d 859,
860-61 (1974) (judiciary lacks the authority to review a prosecutor's waiver decision).
84. See United States v. Bland, 472 F.2d 1329, 1333-34 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412
U.S. 909 (1973) (noting that legislative classifications are entitled to a strong presumption
of validity).
85. 472 F.2d at 1334.
86. Minors adjudicated as adults in the criminal system also lose their rights to private
proceedings, confidential records, and most importantly, the rehabilitative philosophy of
the juvenile justice system. See Alers, supra note 23, at 522.
87. See L. Rxcrnrrz, THE THROWAWAY CHIIDREN (1969); Allen, Criminal Justice, Legal
Values, and the Rehabilitative Ideal, 53 J. Cram. L., CRaMINOLOGY & PoLIc Smi. 226 (1972);
Ketcham, The Unfulfilled Promise of the American Juvenile Court, in JusricE FoR THE CHM
at 22 (M. Rosenheim ed. 1962).
88. See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 US. 565 (1975) (expulsion or suspension from regular
public school programs); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974) (cancellation of prisoner
good time credit); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (revocation of parole); Bell v.
Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971) (suspension of driving privileges); Wheeler v. Montgomery, 397
US. 280 (1970) (termination of old age benefits); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 US. 254 (1970)
(termination of Aid for Dependent Children payments); Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395
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should not be denied a hearing and the opportunity to prove that they are
entitled to the special treatment of juvenile court merely because a prosecutor
rather than a judge makes the transfer decision. The juvenile justice system's
philosophy of individualization and rehabilitation supports incorporating the
judicial-procedural safeguards into the prosecutorial waiver system.
All three mechanisms used to waive juveniles into adult court should provide rigorous procedural safeguards to minors. Moreover, these procedures
should assure that only truly serious offenders will be transferred into the
adult criminal system. The procedural safeguards of the judicial waiver
system and the criticism of the legislative and prosecutorial waiver systems
evince an appropriate societal rejection of adult penal sanction of juvenile
offenders absent aggrevating factors.
JUVENILE EXECUTIONS

UNDER THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT

In light of the rehabilitative treatment accorded youthful offenders, it is
questionable whether a child can ever be justifiably executed. Although
capital punishment of adults has been found constitutional, courts have traditionally viewed juveniles as separate from adults when considering the
appropriateness of a penalty.8 9 The reasons for this distinction between adults
and juveniles may be sufficient to constitutionally prohibit the use of capital
punishment upon minors.
The Supreme Court first analyzed the constitutionality of the death
penalty as applied to adult criminals in Furman v. Georgia.90 In a brief, per
curiam opinion, a plurality of the Court found capital punishment violated
the eighth amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment in the
three cases on appeal. 91 Despite the dissension among the Justices, two common
themes emerge from the concurring and dissenting opinions92 which suggest
U.S. 337 (1969) (garnishment of wages); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (disqualification for unemployment benefits); Willner v. Committee on Character & Fitness, 373 U.S. 96
(1963) (exclusion from admission to the bar); Green v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959) (discharge
from public employment); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958) (denial of tax benefits);
Slochower v. Board of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956) (discharge from public employment).
89. See, e.g., Fryrear v. Commonwealth, 507 S.W.2d 144, 146 (Ky. 1974) (distinction between juveniles and adults is rational); Workman v. Commonwealth, 429 S.W.2d 374 (Ky.
1968) (recognizing that juveniles are to be treated as a separate class from adult criminals);
State v. Kiser, 194 Neb. 513, 514, 233 N.W.2d 571, 571 (1975) (courts dealing with minors
should impose something less than the maximum statutory penalty).
90. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
91. The plurality found thai capital punishment was cruel and unusual because of the
arbitrary and discriminate manner of its imposition. Id. at 240. Statutes restricting the use of
capital punishment through a bifurcated sentencing process, specifically listing mitigating
and aggravating factors which a jury must consider before it imposes the death penalty, have
been upheld. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
92. Justices Brennan and Marshall found the imposition of capital punishment per se
unconstitutional. 408 U.S. at 305-06, 370-71. Justice Douglas emphasized the differential impact
of capital punishment on blacks and the poor and concluded that it was presently being
administered in a discrininatory manner. Id. at 256-57. Justice Stewart focused on the unguided jury discretion. Id. at 309-10. Justice White rejected the death penalty because of the
arbitrary manner in which it was imposed. Id. at 313.
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the -mandates of the eighth amendment. First, a punishment must not be unacceptable to contemporary society as demonstrated by the "evolving standards
of decency."9 3 Second, the punishment must not be "excessive" for the particular offense. 94 Since Furman, the Supreme Court has addressed the validity
of the death penalty for numerous offenses and in many circumstances. 95 In
the absence of other guidelines, the constitutional validity of juvenile
executions appears to depend upon whether the practice offends these two
unifying principles of the Court's capital punishment jurisprudence.
Society's Evolving Standards of Decency
and Juvenile Executions
On several occasions the Supreme Court has sought to discern the meaning of the eighth amendment's proscription of cruel and unusual punishment.96 Whether a punishment is cruel and unusual depends upon public
opinion and society's evolving standards of decency. 97 However, it is difficult
to determine which punishments violate society's evolving standards of de93. See, e.g., id. at 242 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 269 (Brennan, J. concurring);
id. at 327 (Marshall, J., concurring). See also Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962)
(the eighth amendment is not a static concept but must be re-examined in "light of conTrop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (the cruel and
temporary human knowledge ....");
unusual language "must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark
the progress of a maturing society."); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 551 (1910)
(recognizing that in the application of a constitution our contemplation must encompass not
only what has been but what may be, as well).
94. See, e.g., 408 U.S. at 309 (Stewart, J., concurring) ("[death] sentences are 'cruel' in the
sense that they excessively go beyond .. . punishments ... determined to be necessary.'); id.
at 312 (White, J., concurring) (stating that "excessive" penalties are cruel and unusual and
violative of the eighth amendment); id. at 325 (Marshall, J., concurring) (excessive punishments are inherently cruel). See also Louisiana ex tel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 464
(1947) (finding excessive penalties to be cruel and unusual); O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323,
339-40 (1892) (Field, J., dissenting) (the prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment is intended to prevent that which is excessive); Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 134 (1878) (finding
that the cruel and unusual clause is to prevent excessive and unnecessary punishments).
95. See Enmund v. Florida, 102 S. Ct. 3368 (1982) (8th amendment prohibits death
sentence for felony murder conviction of one who does not actually kill or intend to kill);
Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625 (1980) (death penalty inappropriate when jury was not per.
mitted to consider lesser offenses); Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980) (14th and 8th
amendments prohibit death sentence based on vague statute); Bell v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 637
(1978) (8th and 14th amendments require all mitigating factors be considered before death
imposed); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978) (mandatory death sentence vacated; jury must
consider all mitigating factors); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (death sentence for
rape is excessive); Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1977) (pre-sentencing investigation is
prerequisite to imposition of death penalty); Woodson v. Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (mana.
tory death penalty cruel and unusual absent consideration of mitigating factors); Jurek v.
Texas, 428 U.S. 325 (1976) (death penalty for murder and rape upheld; jury considered
all mitigating factors); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (upheld death sentence for
murder during armed robbery; approved bifurcated sentencing procedure).
96. See McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971); Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510
(1968); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958); Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130 (1878). See generally
Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted": The Original Meaning, 57 CALI.

L. REv. 839 (1969) (tracing the development of the eighth amendment's prohibition).
97. See supra cases cited note 93.
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cency. 9s Generally, a punishment violates these standards when "in view of
all the circumstances, the punishment is of such character as to shock the
general conscience and to violate the principles of fundamental fairness." 99
To implement this standard, courts must consider various "objective indicators" that illustrate society's present attitude towards the punishment. 100 An
examination of these objective indicators will aid in evaluating the constitutional propriety of juvenile capital punishment.
Public Opinion: An Indicator of
Evolving Standards of Decency
Prior to 1899 an offender's age was of little relevance in determining the
appropriate punishment for criminal behavior. Consequently, society did not
question the propriety of executing minors.1o1 By the turn of the century
society began to recognize that children were not totally responsible for their
behavior and, therefore, should be treated more benignly than adult offenders.1 0 2 The juvenile justice system was formed to remove youthful offenders
from the adult criminal system as a result of society's desire to rehabilitate
rather than punish its youth. 0 3
The justifications for this revolutionary development were the parens
patriae doctrine1 0 4 and the belief that delinquency resulted from the juvenile's
98. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962) (recognizing the flexible nature
of the eighth amendment). See generally H. BEDAU, THE COURTS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 32-41 (1977).
99. Workman v. Commonwealth, 429 S.W.2d 374, 378 (Ky. 1968). In examining the
scope of the eighth amendment, the Kentucky court recognized the three approaches established in prior Supreme Court cases to determine whether a punishment is cruel and
unusual. The first approach focuses on whether the punishment shocks the general conscience. The second approach weighs the severity of the punishment against the gravity
of the committed offense. The final test is an analysis of whether the punishment was
necessary to achieve the desired "legitimate penal aim." Id.
100. This requirement was mandated by Justice Brennan in Furman. See 408 U.S. at 278
(Brennan, J., concurring) (courts must review "objective indicators" which exhibit society's
present practices towards a punishment).
101. See E. CALVERT, supra note 1, at 3-9.
102. During the twentieth century behavioral scientists' psychological theory has changed
dramatically. For an interesting discussion of this change and the use of the opportunity
theory to explain juvenile delinquency, see Quicker, A Consideration of the Relationship of
"Punitiveness" to Delinquency as Developed in Opportunity Theory, 64 J. GRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 333 (1973).
103. See Allen, The Juvenile Courts and the Limits of Justice, 11 WAYNE L. REv. 676, 677
(1965) (several of the ideas and tendencies which culminated in the establishment of the
juvenile justice system had their origins as far back as the seventeenth century); Fox, supra
note 18, at 1187-1239 (twentieth century reformers rejected the retributive nature of the
adult system and established the therapeutic juvenile justice system to treat juvenile
delinquents).
104. See generally Handler, supra note 22, at 9-10 (discussing the various aspects of
juvenile jurisprudence and the doctrine of parens patriae). Implicit in this doctrine is the
notion that misbehaving children, lacking maturity and an adult sense of responsibility,
should be "put on the right path which leads toward good adult citizenship." See Gasper &
Katkin, supra note 18, at 938 (quoting Mack, The Chancery Procedures in the Juvenile Court,
in THE CHILD, THE CLINIC, AND THE COURT 10 (J. Addams ed. 1927)).
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environment. 10 5 The proponents of reform argued that society has a responsibility to provide a healthy environment for children.'0° Moreover, reformers contended that it would be inappropriate for society to punish
youthful offenders since society's failure to provide an environment conducive
to normal growth caused juvenile delinquency.10 7
The rehabilitative philosophy of the parens patriae doctrine remains the
basis of today's juvenile justice system, but the idea that all juvenile offenders
are immune from adult prosecution has been specifically rejected.1 08 Through
waiver provisions most states provide a means for trying juveniles charged
with serious crimes in the adult criminal system. 0 9 The waiver statute statistic

alone is not determinative of whether society favors capital punishment of
minors.
Juries consistently refuse to impose the death penalty in most cases involving a minor found guilty of a capital offense." 0 Justice Brennan recognized the
implications of this trend in Furman, stating that the consistent refusal to inflict a penalty strongly indicates society's distaste for that punishment."' He

explained that the primary objective indicator of a penalty's public acceptance
is the frequency of its use."12 Moreover, the jury verdict in capital cases has
105. See Fox, supra note 19, at 1187-1239. Proponents of this view asserted that delinquency was the result of such factors as parental failure to provide a sufficiently loving and
stimulating environment. See Quicker, supra note 102, at 333 ('flf blame is attributed to a
malfunctioning society, then it is society which is at fault and needs to be changed, not the
individual.").
106. See Simpson, supra note 20, at 996 (noting "legislation that mandated custody, care,
and discipline for young offenders similar to that which should be provided by parents was
construed as

. .

. giving rise to a legal right to treatment').

107. Id. at 1010-11 (analyzing the control theory of delinquent behavior which asserts
that deviant conduct results not from the particular motivations of the offender but from
"attachment" or "commitment" to society).
108. Indeed, rising juvenile crime rates and recidivism figures have caused the juvenile
justice system to come under attack in recent years. The rehabilitative ideal has not been
totally abandoned, but the belief that society can always deal with juvenile delinquency
without resort to the criminal system has been forsaken. See In re Gault, 387 US. 1, 22 (1967)
(citing the increase in juvenile crime as evidence of the juvenile justice system's lack of
effectiveness); YOUTH IN ADULT CouRTs, supra note 76, at 5 (commenting that the public's
present attitude is that "youngsters are being treated too leniently by the juvenile justice
system and are actually getting away with murder"); Fox, supra note 19, at 1189-92 (similarly
recognizing the criticism accorded the juvenile justice system).
109. See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
110. See Gwin, The Death Penalty: Cruel and Unusual When Imposed Upon Juveniles,
Ky. BEcn & B. 16, 17 (Apr. 1981), quoting W. HEAPs, JUVENILE JusTIcE 11 (1974) (the
author notes that "the usual sentence for minors found guilty of homicide and rape ... is
life imprisonment, without parole, because of their ages.'). See generally P. HAHN, THE
JUVENME OFFENDER AND THE LAW 343 (2d ed. 1978) ("Mf laws are too punitive, or if a par.
ticular setting is known for its excessive severity, convictions in the courts and sentences are
much harder to obtain ....

').

111. 408 U.S. at 300 (Brennan, J., concurring) ("When an unusually severe punishment
is authorized for wide-scale application but not, because of society's refusal, inflicted save in
a few instances, the inference is compelling that there is a deep-seated reluctance to inflict
it").
112. Id. ("The objective indicator of society's view of an unusually severe punishment
is what society does with it....).
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been recognized as a necessary component of the penal system "without which
the determination of punishment could hardly reflect 'the evolving standards
n
Thus, by conof decency' that mark the progress of a maturing society."'1
upon
minors,
juries may be
refusing
to
impose
the
death
sentence
tinually
displaying a societal belief that capital punishment is inappropriate for even
the most serious juvenile offender.
Jury leniency is not the only indication of society's apparent rejection of
juvenile capital punishment. According to recent public opinion surveys, most
citizens favor the retention of capital punishment but oppose its infliction
upon minors.114 This opposition to juvenile executions has fostered numerous
community correctional programs designed to meet the needs of youthful
offenders. 115 Several of these local centers treat juvenile offenders convicted
of serious crimes which would be punishable by death in the adult system.'"
Although these centers have been criticized for diverting limited resources
away from more deserving youths and fostering an attitude of excessive
leniency towards the seriously delinquent,1 7 such separate treatment facilities
have gained acceptance among prison reformists.""'
The action of state legislatures further indicates society's opinion of
113. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 n.15 (1968).
114. See Vidmar & Ellsworth, Public Opinion and the Death Penalty, 26 STAN. L. REV.
1245, 1250 (1974). When public opinion polls are used as a standard for assessing a punishment's constitutionality under the eighth amendment, the conclusiveness of the polls' findings must be subject to close scrutiny.
115. See AMERICAN JUSTICE INSTITUTE, supra note 8, at 149-97.
116. Id. at 186. These programs provide rehabilitative treatment such as remedial education, vocational training and placement, recreation, and advisory counseling. Id. at 188. See
generally M. JONES, SOCIAL PSYCHIATRY IN PRACTICE: THE IDEA OF THE THERAPEUTIC COMMUNITY
(1968) (describing the growth of local and community-based treatment facilities designed to
deal with the problems of juvenile delinquents).
117. For a critical analysis of existing detention facilities and juvenile treatment centers,
see U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE & DELINQ. PREVENTION, REEMOVING
CHILDREN FROM ADULT JAILS 9 (1980) (criticizing the entire method of processing juvenile
delinquents and noting that "juvenile court dispositions swing from a total lack of punishment at the beginning of a criminal career to overly harsh incarceration a few crimes
later . .. . A youth learns that he can break the law and not be punished. He is unimpressed
with the seriousness of the law."); COMMITTEE ON MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. INSIDE & OUTSIDE
THE FAMILY COURT IN THE CITY OF NEW YORK, JUVENILE JUSTICE CONFOUNDED: PRETENSIONS AND

REALITIES OF TREATMENT SERvICis 4 (examining New York's method of processing and
treating juvenile offenders, and remarking that "treatment services have been made least
available for those who are in greatest need .... When the court finds the child, by now
usually an adolescent, needs placement with treatment services, all but a few doors to such
services are closed."); R. SARRI, UNDER LOCK AND KEY: JUVENILES IN JAIL AND DETENTION 65
(National Assessment of Juvenile Corrections 1974) (concluding that secure treatment
facilities are used too often and operated in a discriminatory manner based upon an
offender's racial and socioeconomic background).
118. Proponents of secure juvenile treatment facilities find such incarceration preferable to committing youthful offenders to adult prisons where they will be schooled in
crime. They argue that such facilities provide juveniles an adequate degree of segregation
from hardened adult criminals and allow them to receive rehabilitative treatment. See
Stamm, supra note 26, at 146 (incarceration of juvenile offenders in adult prisons subjects
them to sexual and physical abuse, and is therefore inherently anti-rehabilitative). See also
Sargent & Gordon, supra note 26, at 124-25; Note, supra note 73, at 665-67.
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juvenile capital punishment.1

9

A recent study indicates that thirty-six states

and the federal government presently authorize the imposition of capital
punishment.20 Nine of these states, however, prohibit the execution of
juveniles. 121 Moreover, twenty-four states require the judge to consider a

22
capital defendant's youth as a mitigating factor in determining the sentence.
These statutes indicate increased legislative concern about the execution of
23
minors. 1

Judicial Attitude Toward Juvenile Executions
Judicial attitude toward juvenile executions is another indicator of

society's evolving standards of decency.-

Although no court has expressly

declared the execution of minors to be unconstitutional,1 25 a number of courts
26
have relied upon the offender's age in refusing to impose the death sentence.
Additionally, a number of appellate courts have reduced long prison terms or
27
other harsh penalties because of the defendant's youth.
Several courts have also recognized a fundamental difference between
juveniles and adults for the purposes of measuring a punishment's consti119. But see Goldberg & Dershowitz, Declaring the Death Penalty Unconstitutional, 83

HI- v. L. Rix. 1773, 1782 (1970) (suggesting that legislative action is not the most effective
indicator of a penalty's constitutionality).

120. See UNrrE STATES BUREAU OF JUsTIcE STATISTIC, CAPrTAL PUNISHMENT 1980 10-11
(1980) (providing a detailed analysis of death penalty statutes).
121. See supra statutes cited note 10.
122. See supra statutes cited note 11.
123. All of these statutes have been enacted or have been reaffirmed within the last seven
years. See id.
124. The Supreme Court has declared that the purpose of the eighth amendment is to
serve as a "constitutional check" upon the legislative power to prescribe punishments. Therefore, judicial treatment of juvenile executions must be accorded great weight when analyzing
.he constitutionality of juvenile capital punishment. See Goldberg & Dershowitz, supra note
119, at 1782.
125. See, e.g., State v. Valencia, 124 Ariz. 139, 141, 602 P.2d 807, 809 (1979) (no constitutional provision prohibits sentencing a 16-year-old to death); State v. Prejean, 379 So. 2d
240, 247 (La. 1979) (finding a death sentence for a 17-year-old not excessive).
126. See, e.g., State v. Maloney, 105 Ariz. 348, 464 P.2d 793 (1970) (15-year-old who
murdered his mother and stepfather should receive life imprisonment and not the death
penalty); Cobb v. State, 222 Ga. 733, 152 S.E.2d 403 (1966) (examining the applicability of
the death penalty statute prohibiting capital punishment to persons under 17); State v.
Stewart, 197 Neb. 497, 250 N.W.2d 849 (1979) (16-year-old defendant had no criminal
record, therefore, the death sentence for murder should be reduced to life imprisonment);
State v. Hall, 176 Neb. 295, 125 N.W.2d 918 (1964) (19-year-old defendant convicted of
homicide to receive life imprisonment rather than the death penalty).
127. See, e.g., People v. Goss, 10 I1. App. 3d 543, 294 N.X.2d 744 (1973) (sentence of 50100 years for robbery and murder reduced to 25-100 years because defendant was 18 years old,
had no criminal record, was not the person who actually pulled the trigger of gun, and could
possibly be rehabilitated); People v. Adams, 8 Ill. App. d 8, 288 N.E.2d 724 (1972) (75-100
year sentence for felony murder reduced to 40-100 years because defendant was only 18);
State v. Kiser, 194 Neb. 513, 233 N.W.2d 571 (1975) ("Ordinarily a defendant's youth indicates that a sentence should be something less than the statutory maximum."); State v. Hall,
176 Neb. 295, 125 N.W.2d 918 (1964) (death penalty for murder reduced to life because of
age and feebleness of defendant).
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tutional validity.28 Because minors do not enjoy all of the law's benefits,
courts have often refused to subject them to all of the law's penalties.229
Applying this rationale, the Supreme Court of Kentucky declared the life imprisonment of minors without the benefit of parole to be cruel and unusual
punishment. 30 However, no court has extended this rationale to find juvenile
capital punishment unconstitutional.
Although the United States Supreme Court has never determined
whether a minor can be constitutionally executed, in the recent decision of
Eddings v. Oklahoma 31 the Court came close to deciding the issue. In Eddings.
a sixteen-year-old youth was convicted of first degree murder for killing a
2
police officer and was sentenced to death.13 The defendant made two primary
contentions before the Supreme Court. First, the youth argued that the imposition of the death penalty upon juveniles constituted cruel and unusual
133
Second, Eddings claimed
punishment in violation of the eighth amendment.
that his particular sentence was unconstitutional because the sentencing judge
ruled as a matter of law that only age could be considered as a mitigating
34
factor.
Though the Court had granted certiorari solely to determine whether the
eighth and fourteenth amendments prohibit imposing capital punishment
upon minors,"35 it ultimately vacated the sentence because the lower court
128. See, e.g., May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 536 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)
("Children have a very special place in life which law should reflect."); Fryrear v. Commonwealth, 507 S.W.2d 144, 145 (Ky. 1974) (the distinction between juveniles and adults is
rational); Workman v. Commonwealth, 429 S.W.2d 374, 377 (Ky. 1968) ("[A] different situation prevails when punishment of this stringent nature is applied to a juvenile . . . it
seems inconsistent that one be denied the fruits of the tree of law, yet subjected to all its
thorns.").
The use of corporal punishment in a juvenile detention facility has also been held violative
of the eighth amendment. See, e.g., Nelson v. Heyne, 491 F.2d 352 (7th Cir. 1974) (corporal
punishment consisting of beating juveniles with fraternity paddle was cruel and unusual
punishment). See also Cox v. Turley, 506 F.2d 1347 (6th Cir. 1974) (refusal of police to
notify minor's parents or permit the boy to call parents after minor taken to jail coupled
with minor's confinement with general jail population was cruel and unusual).
129. See Fryrear v. Commonwealth, 507 S.W.2d 144, 145 (Ky. 1974) (recognizing the
"historically separate nature" of minors for the purposes of considering an appropriate punishment). But see Workman v. Commonwealth, 429 S.W.2d 374 (Ky. 1968) (defendant was convicted of raping a 71-year-old woman).
130. See Fryrear,507 S.W.2d at 145.
131. 455 U.S. 104 (1982).
132. Id. at 105.
133. Brief for Petitioner at 16-17, Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982). Petitioner
also contended that even if the Court refused to proscribe the execution of juveniles, the
sentence in this case was unconstitutionally excessive because of mitigating factors. Id. at 17-18.
134. Id. at 18. In affirming the district court's sentence of death, the court of appeals restricted its examination of mitigating factors to the defendant's youth alone and stated: "We,
But the aggravating circumtoo, have given serious consideration to petitioner's youth ....
stances in this case are very serious; and we, too, have to conclude that the petitioner's
youth cannot outweigh them." 455 U.S. at 873 (emphasis added). Thus, both the sentencing
court and the appeals court failed to consider the additional mitigating factors of the defendant's family background and emotional immaturity. Id.
135. See Eddings v. Oklahoma, 450 U.S. 1040 (1981).
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6
failed to consider all relevant mitigating evidence.3 Citing precedent,ar the
majority concluded that in capital cases the eighth amendment requires the
sentencing judge or jury to examine the individual offender's character and

1
record and the circumstances surrounding the particular offense 38 By re-

fusing to consider the defendant's turbulent family history and severe
emotional disturbance, the trial court failed to provide the "type of individualized consideration of mitigating factors" that is required before the
39
death penalty can constitutionally be imposed.
Despite the rather narrow holding of Eddings, broad dicta throughout the
40
opinion suggests that capital punishment is inappropriate for minors.
Recognizing that children are generally less mature and responsible than

adults, the majority opinion expressed grave concern over imposing the
harshest penalty on juvenile offenders. 141 The Court further noted that a

youth's age and emotional maturity are to be given great weight by the
4
sentencing authority considering the imposition of capital punishment. 2

In dissent, Chief Justice Burger explained that the Court granted certiorari

only on the issue of whether the eighth amendment prohibited the imposition
4
of the death sentence upon minors.1 3 Finding that no such constitutional proscription existed, Chief Justice Burger would have upheld the death
sentence.1 4 4 Moreover, the Chief Justice feared that by vacating the death

136. 455 U.S. at 117. The majority opinion vacated the death sentence and remanded
the case for a rehearing, in which the state court would be required to consider "all relevant
mitigating evidence and weigh it against the evidence of aggravating circumstances." Id.
(emphasis added).
137. The Court placed particular emphasis upon the decision of Lockett v. Ohio, 438
US. 586 (1978). In Lockett, the Supreme Court held that "the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that the sentencer . . . not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating
factor, any aspect of a defendant's character or record of any of the circumstances of the
offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death." Id. at 604. The
Court cited several other capital punishment cases in support of its position: Roberts v.
Louisiana, 428 US. 325 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 US. 280 (1976); Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 US. 153 (1976).
158. 455 U.S. at 110.
139. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 US. 586, 606 (1978) (opinion of Burger, C.J.).
140. The majority opinion continually stressed the fact that minors, as a class, are less
mature and responsible for their actions than adults. "[D]uring the formative years of
childhood and adolescence, minors often lack the experience, perspective, and judgment expected of adults." 455 U.S. at 116 (quoting Bellotti v. Baird, 443 US. 622, 635 (1979)). This
dicta was unnecessary to the Court's decision and suggests that the Court opposed the use
of juvenile capital punishment.
141. Id. ("[W]e are concerned here only with the manner of the imposition of the ulti.
mate penalty: the death sentence imposed for the crime of murder upon an emotionally
disturbed youth with a disturbed child's immaturity.').
142. Id. This statement is the clearest indication of the Court's implicit rejection of the
death sentence as an appropriate penalty for minors. The statement was not only unnecessary
to the Court's decision, but as the dissent noted, the Court lacked the authority under
present case law to determine the weight specific mitigating factors must be given by the
sentencing judge. Id. at 120.
143. Id. Chief Justice Burger criticized the majority for going beyond this issue and
basing its opinion upon the defendan's "eleventh-hour claim." Id.
144. ld. at 128.
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sentence and failing to address the proper issue, the majority opinion might
be misunderstood as establishing a constitutional prohibition of juvenile
capital punishment. 14 5 Subsequent decisions will reflect the degree to which
Chief Justice Burger's concern is realized.
Juvenile Executions as Excessive Punishment
A second constitutional requirement of the eighth amendment is that a
punishment must not be excessive.146 Supreme Court decisions establish the
means to determine whether a punishment is excessive. A punishment may be
so offensive to "fundamental concepts of human dignity" that it is considered
excessive. 14 7 A punishment may also be deemed excessive if it "serves no
148
penal purpose more effectively than a less severe penalty.'
Capital punishment is uniquely degrading to human dignity. As Justice
Brennan noted in Furman, "the calculated killing of a human being by the
State involves, by its very nature, a denial of the executed person's
humanity.' ' 49 Further, no other punishment is as severe as the death sentence
in terms of its pain, finality, or enormity. 150 Thus, an application of the Supreme Court standards suggests that the death penalty contravenes the
constitutional prohibition of excessive penalties.
The Supreme Court rejected this argument in Gregg v. Georgia.'51 In upholding the constitutionality of capital punishment, a plurality of the Court
again recognized that a penalty must not offend human dignity.152 However,
the plurality altered the penological purpose of the punishment standard. It
announced a stricter test, requiring an analysis of the sanction imposed to
determine whether it is "so totally without penological justification that it
results in the gratuitous infliction of suffering.' 1 53 The two social purposes of
capital punishment, retribution and deterrence, were then tested against the
human dignity and penological justification standards.154 The Gregg plurality
concluded some crimes are so heinous that a community might demand retri145. Id. Although Justice Burger realized that "the Court stops far short of suggesting
that there is any constitutional proscription against imposition of the death penalty on a
person who was under age 18," he was concerned that the majority opinion might be interpreted in an overly-expansive manner. Id.
146. See, e.g., Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 464 (1947) (an excessive penalty constitutes cruel and unusual punishment); O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 US. 323,
339-40 (1892) (Field, J., dissenting) (import of the eighth amendment is to prohibit those
punishments which are "excessive"); Wilkenson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 134 (1879) (purpose
of the cruel and unusual prohibition is to prevent the infliction of excessive penalties).
147. See Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 366 (1910).
148. See People v. McNair, 46 A.D.2d 476, 480, 363 N.Y.S.2d 151, 156 (1975) (citing
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 280 (Brennan, J., concurring)).
149. Furman, 408 U.S. at 290.
150. 408 U.S. at 287 (Brennan, J., concurring).
151. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
152. Id. at 182 (citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958)).
153. Id. at 182-83. The plurality cited Furman for the proposition that a court cannot
"invalidate a category of penalties because [it deems] less severe penalties adequate to serve
the ends of penology." Id.
154. Id. at 183-87.
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bution in the form of the death penalty to preserve human dignity defiled by
the crime. 155 The plurality also found legislatures could reasonably conclude
that the death penalty has a deterrent effect and, thus, a penological justification.

56

Most states justify retaining capital punishment on the grounds of both
retribution and deterrence. Proponents contend that the death penalty is
necessary because it prevents the commission of capital crimes more effectively
than any less severe punishment. 5 7 State legislatures have found that the death
penalty is a necessary retribution that pacifies the community's sense of outrage. 58 The validity of these justifications must be re-examined, however, when
states seek to impose the death penalty upon minors.
The Deterrent Effect of Capital
Punishment Upon Juveniles
Deterrence is defined as the restraining influence that the threat of punishment has upon potential offenders. 59 Criminal psychologists believe that
penal sanctions have a moralizing, educating, and socializing influence on
future offenders by expressing societal condemnation of prohibited activity.160
The degree to which a penalty actually achieves these deterrent objctives, however, depends upon two factors. First, there must be a probability that an individual would commit a particular crime if that crime were not punished in
the prescribed manner.' 61 Second, the certainty of punishment must be
sufficiently communicated to the potential offender. 62 Behavioral scientists
155.

Id. at 184.

156. Id. at 186-87. After determining that there is insufficient empirical evidence to
support or refute the death penalty's deterrent effect, the plurality declared that the "value
of capital punishment as a deterrent of crime is a complex factual issue the resolution of
which properly rests with the legislatures." Id. at 186.
157. Probably the most widely accepted and frequently advanced argument in favor of
the death penalty is that the threat of its infliction deters people from committing capital
offenses. See H. BEDAU, supra note 3, at 258.
158. See 408 US. at 303 (Brennan, J., concurring).
159. See Andenaes, General Prevention Revisited: Research and Policy Implications, 66
J. Cans. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 338, 341-43 (1975).

160. Id. at 341. See also Hawkins, Punishment and Deterrence: The Educative, Moralizing,
and Habituative Effects, 1969 Wis. L. REv.550 (noting that the infliction of punishment does
more than just deter future offenses as it serves to reinforce societal norms and expectations).
161. See Clarke, Getting 'Em out of Circulation:Does Incarceration of Juvenile Offenders
Reduce Crime?, 65 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 528, 529 (1974). The author examines the potential deterrent effect of penal incarceration. Although conceding that the threat of imprisonment does provide some deterrent effect, the author notes that before a punishment can
truly be viewed as a deterrent two assumptions must be made: "[T]hat the offender has a
certain probability of offending" and "that the threat of incarceration is communicated in
various ways and that behavior is influenced by the communication." Id.
162. Id. The author states that these two underlying assumptions render the determination of a punishment's deterrent effect a highly speculative and nearly impossible procedure.
-See also E. FATrAH, A STUDY OF THE DETERRENT EFFEcr OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT WITH SPECIAL
REFERENCE TO THE CANADIAN SITUATION

16 (Dep't of the Solicitor General Canada 1973)

("[Tlhere is no doubt th.t the communication of the threat [of punishment] is of importance
to its effectiveness").
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have found that neither of these factors are present in the vast majority of
capital cases. 16' Therefore, they argue that capital punishment fails to act as a
credible deterrent.'16 This conclusion appears to apply with greater force when
considering the deterrent effect of capital punishment upon minors.
Social scientists universally reject free will and rational calculation as the
major motivating factors behind juvenile crime and delinquency.65 The
factors normally associated with juvenile crime are poverty, poor education,
unsuitable home environment, social status, and minority group membership. 166 Most serious juvenile offenses are committed by irresponsible,
emotionally disturbed youths acting out of fear or frustration.' 6 7 Behavioral
research indicates that juveniles do not rationally consider the commission of
a crime and then balance the probability of receiving the death sentence as
opposed to life imprisonment. 68 Thus, the deterrent value of juvenile capital
16 9
punishment is suspect.
163. See Frost, The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: A Cross-State Analysis of
the 1960's, 61 MINN. L. REV. 743, 745 (1977) (examining the difference in capital crime rates
among those states retaining and those abolishing the use of the death penalty and concluding
that "capital punishment does not, on balance, deter homicides"); Passell, The Deterrent
Effect of the Death Penalty: A Statistical Test, 28 STAN. L. REV. 61, 80 (1975) (presenting a
a cross-state analysis of the deterrent effect of capital punishment and concluding that there
is "no reasonable way of interpreting the cross-section data that would lend support to the
deterrence hypothesis.").
The most conspicuous research purporting to find that capital punishment does have a
deterrent effect is that of Isaac Ehrlich. See Ehrlich, Deterrence: Evidence and Inference,
85 YALE L.J. 209 (1975). The research reporting such a deterrent effect, however, has been
strongly challenged on both methodological and substantive grounds, See Bladus & Cole, A
Comparison of the Work of Thorsten Sellin and Isaac Ehrlich on the Deterrent Effect of
Capital Punishment, 85 YALE L.J. 170 (1975); Bowers & Pierce, The Illusion of Deterrence in
Isaac Ehrlich's Research on Capital Punishment, 85 YALE L.J. 187 (1975).
164. See Frost, supra note 163, at 744-80.
165. Although numerous theories have been advanced to explain the causes of "deviant" or "delinquent" behavior, the ideals of free will and rational choice have traditionally
been rejected. For an excellent discussion of the various behavioral theories, see P. HAHN,
supra note 110, at 40-56.
166. See Williams & Gold, From Delinquent Behavior to Official Delinquency, 20 Soc.
PROBs. 209, 210 (1972) (distinguishing "hidden" and "official" delinquency and the factors that
operate to cause each).
167. See P. HAHN, supra note 110, at 342. The author questions the deterrent value of
punishment upon juveniles, concluding that "for the great mass of delinquents who are acting out severe deprivation or who commit acts of delinquency in fits of passion, or because
of medical reasons, or for a whole host of other causal factors, pure punishment is not the
answer." Id.
168. 408 U.S. 283, 301 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring) (deterrence only possible if
criminal rationally weighs the consequences).
169. The environmental factors that are generally believed to cause delinquency arguably
make it unlikely that youths rationally weigh the probability of receiving a particular punish-

ment before committing a crime. See, e.g., V. EISNER, THE DELINQUENCY LABEL: THE Ep'DEMIOLOCY OF JUVENILE DELINQUENCY 68 (1969) (citing improper home environment and the
absence of fathers in the home as critical factors in youth delinquency); W. MORRISON,
JUVENILE OFFENDERS

121 (1973) (noting that a youth's family life is the chief factor in de-

termining the future potential of delinquency in that individual); D. WEST, WHO BECOmES
(concluding that poor housing conditions and low social class conDELINQUENT? 186 (1973)
tributed significantly to delinquency).
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The certainty of a punishment's imposition is the second means of assessing
its deterrent value. 170 Empirical evidence suggests that deterrence can be
achieved only when potential offenders know that the commission of a particular crime will result in a particular punishment. 171 The penalty for a
given offense serves as a deterrent only if its imposition is relatively certain.7 2
A majority of the Justices in Furman recognized this requirement, and Justice
White specifically noted that "the death penalty could so seldom be imposed
that it would cease to be a credible deterrent."' 7 3 The death penalty is so infrequently inflicted upon minors 7 4 that capital punishment fails to have a
deterrent effect upon juveniles.
The Retributive Value of Juvenile Executions
To support the retention of capital punishment, states invoke the Mosaic
law "an eye for an eye."' 75 Legislatures contend that popular insistence on the
death penalty as retribution for certain crimes requires the states to execute
offenders to prevent the public from taking the law into its own hands.176
Statistics, however, refute the contention that modem society deems retribution
a sufficient justification for capital punishment. 77 Additionally, modem
penology emphasizes rehabilitation of the criminal, and many courts refuse to
recognize retribution as sufficient justification for punishment.' 8s
170.
it must
171.
172.

See Clarke, supra note 161, at 529 (before a punishment can serve as a deterrent
be "sufficiently communicated" to the offender).
For an excellent discussion of this contention, see H. BEDAU, supra note 3, at 269.
See E. FATrAH, supra note 162, at 14-16. The author notes the critical importance of

certainty of conviction and quotes an earlier criminologist's proposition that "the effectiveness of a deterrent is derived less from its severity than from its certainty." Id. (quoting
Temple (1934)).
173. 408 US. at 311 (White, J., concurring).
174. See W. HEAPs, supra note 110, at 11.
175. Deuteronomy 19:21. Proponents of capital punishment often cite Genesis 9:6 as
further support for the imposition of the death penalty ("[W]hoso sheddeth man's blood, by
man his blood be shed."). See generally Little, The Law of Sentencing as a Public Ceremony,
35 U. FLA. L. Rxv. 1 (1983) (discusses the relative goals of deterrence, retribution and re-

habilitation).
176. See H. BEDAu, supra note 3,at 258-59 ("It is highly desirable that criminals should
be hated, that punishments inflicted upon them should be so contrived as to give expression
to that hatred . . . . When a man is hung, there is an end of our relations with him. His
execution is a way of saying, 'You are not fit for this world, take your chance elsewhere."')
(quoting 2 J.

STEPnEN,

A HISTORY

OF TE CRImINAL LAW OF ENGLAND

81 (1883)). See also 408

US. at 303 (Brennan, J., concurring) (capital punishment satisfies "the popular demand for
grievous condemnation of abhorrent crimes and thus prevents disorder, lynching, 'and
attempts by private citizens to take the law into their own hands.').
177. See H. BEDAU, supra note 3,at 133 (surveys indicate, that less than 40% of the
public view retribution as a sufficient justification for the death penalty).
178. Justice Marshall recognized that "[t]o preserve the integrity of the Eighth Amendment, the [Supreme] Court has consistently denigrated retribution as a permissible goal of
punishment." 408 U.S. at 344 (Marshall, J., concurring). While Justice Marshall acknowledged
that retribution necessarily underlies the imposition of some punishment upon a criminal,
he concluded that this does not justify the infliction of any punishment. Rather, he viewed
the eighth amendment as an "insulation from our baser selves" and a limitation upon the
weight that vengeance can be given in our penal system. Id. at 344-45.
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Today capital punishment is rarely imposed even upon adult defendants. 1 9
This infrequent imposition raises doubts as to whether capital punishment actually provides any retributive function to society. As stated in Furman, "when
the overwhelming number of criminals who commit capital crimes go to
prison, it cannot be concluded that death serves the purpose of retribution
more effectively than imprisonment."'' s0 This contention is particularly appropriate to the execution of minors since very few juveniles are adjudicated
under the adult penal system"8 ' and even fewer are sentenced to death.'8 ' The
increased efforts of state and federal governments to provide the juvenile
offender with rehabilitative rather than punitive treatment further refute the
notion that society demands retribution against the criminal youth.8 3 Even if
some retributive attitude towards the serious juvenile offender exists, it is
difficult to justify the execution of children on that basis alone.
CONCLUSION

Society has demonstrated its desire to rehabilitate rather than punish youth
through the establishment of a separate juvenile justice system designed to
meet the special needs of juvenile offenders. Although juveniles may be
transferred into the adult criminal court through state waiver mechanisms, the
Supreme Court has placed constitutional limitations upon the exercise of this
authority under judicial waiver statutes. Numerous commentators have urged
that similar protections be incorporated into legislative and prosecutorial
waiver statutes so that all minors are afforded minimum due process protections before transfer into the adult criminal system. These limitations and
suggestions illustrate society's fundamental rejection of the adult criminal
system's punitive sanctions as a means of dealing with juvenile offenders.
Because of increased societal concern over the rehabilitation of youth,
executing juveniles can no longer be tolerated. Although capital punishment
has been constitutionally upheld when imposed upon adults, a different situation is presented when states seek to execute children. Most citizens today
oppose the use of capital punishment upon minors, and responsive legislatures
have enacted laws designed to protect the rights of juvenile offenders. Similarly,
courts have grown increasingly reluctant to impose the death penalty upon
children. Moreover, behavioral research indicates that capital punishment fails
179. See H. BEDAU, supra note 3, at 3 (describing the drastic reduction in the use of
capital punishment in the United States within the last half-century).
180. 408 U.S. at 304 (Brennan, J., concurring). This factor led Justice Brennan to conclude that today's society wishes to prevent crime, not to kill criminals simply "to get even
with them." Id. at 305.
181. See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
182. See W. HEAPs, supra note 110, at 11.
183. In light of the existence of a separate juvenile justice system and the recent growth
of additional programs designed to treat rather than punish criminal youths, it can indeed
be questioned whether society seeks retribution from juvenile delinquents. See F. ZIMPJNG,
CONFRONTING YOUTH CRIME 65 (1978) (quoting Mack, The Juvenile Court, 22 HARv. L. REv.
107 (1909)) ("[T]he purpose of juvenile justice was not so much to punish as to reform, not
to degrade but to uplift, not to crush but to develop, not to make him a criminal but a
worthy citizen.").
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to deter youthful offenders because of the special operational factors which
cause juvenile delinquency. These findings, along with society's rejection of
retribution as a sufficient justification for juvenile punishment, indicate that
capital punishment of minors is an excessive penalty, contrary to the evolving
standards of decency. Juvenile capital punishment, therefore, violates the
eighth amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment.
WMLIAM
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